Administrative Appeal Decision - Williams, Derrick (2020-01-03) by unknown
Fordham Law School 
FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History 
Parole Administrative Appeal Decisions Parole Administrative Appeal Documents 
May 2021 
Administrative Appeal Decision - Williams, Derrick (2020-01-03) 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/aad 
Recommended Citation 
"Administrative Appeal Decision - Williams, Derrick (2020-01-03)" (2021). Parole Information Project 
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/aad/483 
This Parole Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Parole Administrative Appeal Documents 
at FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Parole 
Administrative Appeal Decisions by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of 
Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
( 
STATE OF NEW YORK - BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 
Name: Williams, Derrick 
NYSID: 
DIN: OO-A-6019 
Appearances: Cheryl Kates Esq. 











February 2019 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 12 
months. 
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    Appellant challenges the February 2019 determination of the Board, denying release and 
imposing a 12-month hold. Appellant’s underlying instant offenses involved him committing 13 
different robberies, 11 of them at gunpoint. Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the decision 
is arbitrary and capricious, and irrational bordering on impropriety, in that the Board failed to 
consider and/or properly weigh the required statutory factors. 2) the decision lacks details. 3) the 
letter to his criminal defense lawyer was sent to the wrong address. 4) all DA letters in opposition 
are void, as they violate the plea bargain contract. 5) the Parole Board Report has errors. 6) the 
decision resentenced appellant to life without parole. 7) the Board ignored all youth considerations 
in his criminal history. 8) the decision violates the due process clause of the constitution. 9) the 
decision failed to list any facts in support of the statutory standard cited. 10) the decision was 
predetermined. 11) the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law, 
and the 2017 regulations, in that they are  rehabilitation and forward based. Additionally, the 
COMPAS is evidence based and carries with it a presumption of release. The attempted departure 
was void. And the COMPAS had errors in it.  12) the 12 month hold is excessive. 
 
   Discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient 
performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if 
such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his 
release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of 
his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); 
accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 
(3d Dept. 2014).  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is 
relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and 
criminal behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 
N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate 
decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 
718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000).  Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite 
factors is solely within the Board’s discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 
1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d 
at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 
415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).  The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give 
them equal weight.  Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 
2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 
(2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st 
Dept. 2007). 
 
   Although the Board placed particular emphasis on the nature of the crime, the Board considered 
other factors and was not required to give equal weight to or discuss each factor considered.  Matter 
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of Gordon v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1502, 50 N.Y.S.3d 627 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Arena v. 
New York State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 156 A.D.3d 1101, 65 N.Y.S.3d 471 (3d 
Dept. 2017);  Matter of Peralta v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.3d 1151, 69 N.Y.S.3d 885 
(3d Dept. 2018).   
    The Board decision may mention that he committed one offense while on parole. Matter of Webb 
v. Travis, 26 A.D.3d 614, 810 N.Y.S.2d 233 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Thompson v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 120 A.D.3d 1518, 1518-19, 992 N.Y.S.2d 464, 465 (3d Dept. 2014); Matter 
of Moore v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 137 A.D.3d 1375, 26 N.Y.S.3d 412, 413 (3d Dept. 
2016). Matter of Ward v. New York State Div. of Parole, 144 A.D.3d 1375, 40 N.Y.S.3d 803 (3d 
Dept. 2016); Matter of Guzman v. Dennison, 32 A.D.3d 798, 799, 821 N.Y.S.2d 208, 208 (1st 
Dept. 2006). 
      The fact that the Board afforded greater weight to the inmate’s criminal history, as opposed to 
other positive factors, does not render the denial of parole for that reason irrational or improper.  
Matter of Davis v. Evans, 105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of Lashway 
v. Evans, 110 A.D.3d 1417, 1418, 974 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of McKee v. New 
York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204 (3d Dept. 1990).   
   The Board may consider an inmate’s need to complete rehabilitative programming in denying 
parole.  See Matter of Allen v. Stanford, 161 A.D.3d 1503, 1506, 78 N.Y.S.3d 445 (3d Dept.), lv. 
denied, 32 N.Y.3d 903 (2018); Matter of Barrett v. New York State Div. of Parole, 242 A.D.2d 763, 
661 N.Y.S.2d 857 (3d Dept. 1997); see also Matter of Connelly v. New York State Div. of Parole, 
286 A.D.2d 792, 729 N.Y.S.2d 808, 809 (3d Dept.), appeal dismissed 97 N.Y.2d 677, 738 
N.Y.S.2d 291 (2001). 
   After considering the relevant factors, the Board was allowed to place greater emphasis on the 
inmate’s criminal record including prior failures while under community supervision.  See, e.g., 
Matter of Bello v. Bd. of Parole, 149 A.D.3d 1458, 53 N.Y.S.3d 715 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of 
Davis v. Evans, 105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2013); People ex rel. Herbert v. New 
York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881, 884 (1st Dept. 1983).  
   The Board may consider negative aspects of the COMPAS instrument.  Matter of Espinal v. New 
York Bd. of Parole, 2019 NY Slip Op 04080, 2019 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4057 (3d Dept. May 23, 
2019) (COMPAS instrument yielded mixed results); Matter of Bush v. Annucci, 148 A.D.3d 1392, 
50 N.Y.S.3d 180 (3d Dept. 2017) (COMPAS instrument with mixed results including substance 
abuse relevant given use before crime); Matter of Wade v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1487, 52 N.Y.S.3d 
508 (3d Dept. 2017) (low risk felony violence but probable risk for substance abuse alcohol related 
crimes); Matter of Crawford v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 144 A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228 
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(3d Dept. 2016) (scores not uniformly low including family support), lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 901, 
57 N.Y.S.3d 704 (2017).   
   There is a presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to Judges and administrative fact-
finders.  See People ex rel. Carlo v. Bednosky, 294 A.D.2d 382, 383, 741 N.Y.S.2d 703 (2d Dept. 
2002); People ex. rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 180 A.D.2d 914, 916, 580 N.Y.S.2d 
957, 959 (3d Dept. 1992).  The Board is presumed to follow its statutory commands and internal 
policies in fulfilling its obligations.  See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 256, 120 S. Ct. 1362, 1371 
(2000). There is no evidence the Board’s decision was predetermined based upon the instant offense.  
Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of 
Hakim-Zaki v. New York State Div. of Parole, 29 A.D.3d 1190, 814 N.Y.S.2d 414 (3d Dept. 2006); 
Matter of Guerin v. New York State Div. of Parole, 276 A.D.2d 899, 695 N.Y.S.2d 622 (3d Dept. 
2000). Nor was any penal philosophy discussed. Appellant has failed to overcome the presumption 
that the Board complied with its duty.  See Matter of Davis v. New York State Div. of Parole, 114 
A.D.2d 412, 494 N.Y.S.2d 136 (2d Dept. 1985). 
 
   That the Board “did not recite the precise statutory language of Executive Law § 259-i (2)(c)(A) 
in support of its conclusion to deny parole does not undermine its conclusion.”  Matter of Mullins 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016) 
(citation omitted); accord Matter of Reed v. Evans, 94 A.D.3d 1323, 942 N.Y.S.2d 387 (3d Dept. 
2012).  The language used by the Board was “only semantically different” from the statute.  Matter 
of Miller v. New York State Div. of Parole, 72 A.D.3d 690, 691–92, 897 N.Y.S.2d 726, 727 (2d 
Dept. 2010); Matter of James v. Chairman of New York State Div. of Parole, 19 A.D.3d 857, 858, 
796 N.Y.S.2d 735, 736 (3d Dept. 2005); see also People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of 
Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983) (upholding decision that denied release 
as “contrary to the best interest of the community”); Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 
920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011) (Board provided adequate statutory rationale). 
   The Board’s decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was 
sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole.  Matter of Applegate 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of 
Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); 
Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. 
Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).   
   Appellant’s assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is 
without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release 
per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein.  Executive 
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Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 
745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 
281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001).  The Board was vested with discretion to 
determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration 
set by the Court.  Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 
2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. 
denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007).  The appellant has not in any manner been 
resentenced.  Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 
N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016). 
   Nothing in the Board’s decision indicates a permanent denial of parole consideration. Hodge v 
Griffin, 2014 WL 2453333 (SDNY 2014). 
      An inmate has no Constitutional right to be conditionally released on parole before expiration 
of a valid sentence.  Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 
1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 
(1980); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997).  The 
New York State parole scheme “holds out no more than a possibility of parole” and thus does not 
create a protected liberty interest implicating the due process clause.  Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d 
at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); Matter 
of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005). 
   Nothing in the due process clause requires the Parole Board to specify the particular evidence on 
which rests the discretionary determination an inmate is not ready for conditional release. 
Duemmel v Fischer, 368 Fed.Appx. 180, 182 (2d Cir. 2010). There is no due process requirement 
that the Parole Board disclose its release criteria.  Haymes v Regan, 525 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1975).    
The due process clause is not violated by the Board’s balancing of the statutory criteria, and which 
is not to be second guessed by the courts. Mathie v Dennison, 2007 WL 2351072 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); 
MacKenzie v Cunningham, 2014 WL 5089395 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
    Parole is not constitutionally based, but is a creature of statute which may be imposed subject to 
conditions imposed by the state legislature. Banks v Stanford, 159 A.D.3d 134, 71 N.Y.S.3d 515 
(2d Dept. 2018). Parole release is a statutory grant of a restricted form of liberty prior to the 
expiration of a sentence. Johnson v Superintendent Adirondack Correctional Facility, 174 A.D.3d 
992, 106 N.Y.S.3d 408 (3d Dept. 2019). 
   The Board was aware of appellant’s age when dealing with his prior criminal history. But the 
cases cited by appellant don’t apply in this case as appellant was an adult when he committed 
these crimes. 
 
STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION 
Name: Williams, Derrick DIN: 00-A-6019  
Facility: Shawangunk CF AC No.:  03-080-19 B 
    
Findings: (Page 5 of 7) 
 
   The DA letters do not violate any legal contractual agreement as criminal proceedings are 
totally different then contractual matters. 
   Erroneous information, if not used in the decision as a basis for parole denial, will not lead to a 
reversal.  Matter of Khatib v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 118 A.D.3d 1207, 988 N.Y.S.2d 286 
(3d Dept. 2014); Matter of Restivo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 70 A.D.3d 1096, 895 
N.Y.S.2d 555 (3d Dept. 2010) [status report]; Matter of Grune v. Bd. of Parole, 41 A.D.3d 1014, 
838 N.Y.S.2d 694 (3d Dept. 2007)[status report]; see also Matter of Gordon v. Stanford, 148 
A.D.3d 1502, 50 N.Y.S.3d 627 (3d Dept. 2017) [misstatement by commissioner in interview that 
inmate did not correct]; Matter of Perea v. Stanford, 149 A.D.3d 1392, 53 N.Y.S.3d 231 (3d Dept. 
2017) [erroneous information in PBR which inmate corrected during interview].    
   The defense attorney letter was sent to the correct address. 
   Denial of parole is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Parole Board relied on the factors 
defined by the New York statute. Hodge v Griffin, 2014 WL 2453333(S.D.N.Y. 2014) citing 
Romer v Travis, 2003 WL 21744079. An arbitrary action is one without sound basis in reason and 
without regard to the facts. Rationality is what is reviewed under an arbitrary and capricious 
standard. Hamilton v New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d 
Dept. 2014). An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in reason 
or regard to the facts. Ward v City of Long Beach, 20 N.Y.3d 1042 (2013). Denial is neither 
arbitrary nor capricious when the Board relies on factors defined by New York statute.  Siao-Paul 
v. Connolly, 564 F. Supp. 2d 232, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Hanna v New York State Board of Parole, 
169 A.D.3d 503, 92 N.Y.S.3d 621 (1st Dept. 2019). 
   The appellant has failed to demonstrate that the Parole Board’s determination was affected by a 
showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety. Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 718 
N.Y.S.2d 704 (2001); Matter of Russo v New York State Board of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 77, 427 
N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980). 
   In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, 
it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 
914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of 
Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State 
Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. 
Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881. 
       Appellant’s claim that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive 
Law is rejected. Dolan v New York State Board of Parole, 122 A.D.3d 1058, 995 N.Y.S.2d 850 (3d 
Dept. 2014); Tran v Evans, 126 A.D.3d 1196, 3 N.Y.S.3d 633 (3d Dept. 2015); Boccadisi v Stanford, 
133 A.D.3d 1169, 20 N.Y.S.3d 477 (3d Dept. 2015). Furthermore, the 2011 Executive Law 
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amendments have been incorporated into the regulations adopted by the Board in 2017. The 2017 
amended regulations don’t create any substantive right to release, but rather, merely increase 
transparency in the final decision. The amended regulation was intended to increase transparency 
in the Board’s decision making by providing an explanation if and when the Board departs from 
scales in denying an inmate release.  Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 27, 2017 at 2.   
 
   The 2011 amendments to the Executive Law, as well as the state regulations governing parole, do 
not create a legitimate expectancy of release that would give rise to a due process interest in parole. 
Fuller v Evans, 586 Fed.Appx. 825 (2d Cir. 2014) cert.den. 135 S.Ct. 2807, 192 L.Ed2d 851. 
   The Board considered the COMPAS instrument and did not depart from it.  That is, the decision 
was not impacted by a departure from a scale.  Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 27, 2017 at 2. The 
Board cited several negative parts of the COMPAS in its decision. 
   There is no merit to Appellant’s claim that a favorable COMPAS instrument gives rise to a 
presumption of rehabilitation and release.  Since 1977, the Board has been required to apply the 
same three-part substantive standard. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).  The 2011 amendments 
require the Board to incorporate risk and needs assessment principles to “assist” in measuring an 
inmate’s rehabilitation and likelihood of success upon release.  Executive Law § 259-c(4).  The 
statute thus does not clearly create a presumption of rehabilitation based on a favorable risk and 
needs assessment, let alone a presumption of parole release requiring the Board to provide 
countervailing evidence.  Indeed, while the Board might, for example, find an inmate sufficiently 
rehabilitated to satisfy the first prong of the standard—that the inmate will “live and remain at 
liberty without violating the law,” the Board could also find, in its discretion, as it did here, that 
the inmate’s release would be incompatible with the welfare of society or would unduly deprecate 
the seriousness of a crime. The text of the statute therefore flatly contradicts the inmate’s assertion 
that even uniformly low COMPAS scores create a presumption of release. See Matter of King v. 
Stanford, 137 A.D.3d at 1397. The COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must 
weigh along with the statutory factors for purposes of deciding whether the three standards are 
satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d at 1108; accord Matter of 
Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d at 1061. This is exactly what occurred here.   
 
   Appellant’s contention that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 Amendments to the Executive 
Law is likewise without merit.  Although Appellant alleges the amendments represented a 
fundamental change in the legal regime governing parole determinations requiring a focus on 
forward-looking factors, this proposition is not supported by the language of the statute itself, 
considering the relatively modest change to Section 259-c(4) and the absence of any substantive 
change to Section 259-i(2), which governs the discretionary release consideration process.  The 
Board still must conduct a case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors, 
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including the instant offense.  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A); Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 
A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014).  Thus, even where the First Department 
has “take[n] the unusual step of affirming the annulment of a decision of [the Board]”, it has 
nonetheless reiterated that “[t]he Board is not obligated to refer to each factor, or to give every 
factor equal weight” and rejected any requirement that the Board prioritize “factors which 
emphasize forward thinking and planning over the other statutory factors.”  Matter of Rossakis v. 
New York State Bd. of Parole, 146 A.D.3d 22, 29 (1st Dept. 2016). 
 
   Appellant did not raise any alleged COMPAS errors during the interview, thereby waiving the 
issue. .  Matter of Morrison v. Evans, 81 A.D.3d 1073, 916 N.Y.S.2d 655 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter 
of Vanier v. Travis, 274 A.D.2d 797, 711 N.Y.S.2d 920 (3d Dept. 2000). 
 
   In the absence of impropriety, the reconsideration date set by the Board will not be disturbed.   
Matter of Tatta v. State of N.Y., Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 907, 908, 737 N.Y.S.2d 163 (3d Dept. 
2002); accord Matter of Evans v. Dennison, 13 Misc. 3d 1236(A), 831 N.Y.S.2d 353 (Sup. Ct. 
Westchester Co. 2006) (rejecting challenge to 24-month hold). 
 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
